NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF LAW &
TECHNOLOGY
Volume 23

Issue 3

Article 6

4-1-2022

This is No Ovary-Action: Femtech Apps Need Stronger
Regulations to Protect Data and Advance Public Health Goals
Allysan Scatterday

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncjolt
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Allysan Scatterday, This is No Ovary-Action: Femtech Apps Need Stronger Regulations to Protect Data
and Advance Public Health Goals, 23 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 636 (2022).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncjolt/vol23/iss3/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology by an authorized editor of Carolina Law
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY
VOLUME 23, ISSUE 3: APRIL 2022
THIS IS NO OVARY-ACTION: FEMTECH APPS NEED STRONGER
REGULATIONS TO PROTECT DATA AND ADVANCE PUBLIC
HEALTH GOALS
Allysan Scatterday*
Millions of people download and use “femtech,” or female
technology, applications to track patterns in their reproductive
health, including menstruation and fertility. The market for femtech
apps is projected to experience rapid growth over the next decade.
Despite the highly sensitive, intimate nature of data collected by
femtech apps, U.S. privacy law leaves these apps largely
unregulated. Recent investigations reveal that femtech app
developers have misled users about their privacy policies, left user
accounts vulnerable to security threats, and sold user data to
advertisers and other third parties without notice or consent.
Femtech app users urgently need legal solutions that strengthen
privacy protections; however, along with maintaining data privacy,
proposed actions should also address ways to use data collected by
femtech apps to fill critical gaps in women’s health research.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider this paradox: a thirty-year-old person, who has been
trying to conceive their second child for three years, visits an
obstetrician after recently experiencing a fourth miscarriage. They
share details with the physician regarding their physical and mental
health symptoms, their most recent menstrual cycle, and their sexual
history. Because the doctor’s office is a healthcare provider, all of
the information the patient shares will remain confidential unless
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they provide written authorization consenting to disclosure.1
Although the obstetrician records data from the appointment
electronically, the doctor’s office is required to implement
technological safeguards to ensure that the information remains
secure.2 After arriving home from the appointment, the patient opens
a fertility-tracking app on their phone and records the same personal
health information that they shared with their doctor. Unfortunately,
current laws do not require the app to maintain the privacy or
security of that data.3 In fact, the app can profit off of the data, selling
it to advertisers and third parties without providing notice or
receiving consent.4
This hypothetical represents reality for millions of users of
female technology, or “femtech,”5 apps in the United States today.
This Article explores the complex issues surrounding data collected
by femtech apps and emphasizes the need to strengthen privacy
protections while simultaneously considering ways to ethically use
such data to fill critical information gaps in women’s health
research.6 This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II introduces
femtech and the current privacy concerns associated with such apps.
1

See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2013).
See id.
3
See Celia Rosas, The Future Is Femtech: Privacy and Data Security Issues
Surrounding Femtech Applications, 15 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 319, 323 (2019).
4
See Danielle Keats Citron, A New Compact for Sexual Privacy, 62 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1763, 1785–87 (2021).
5
The term “femtech” refers broadly to “an expanding category of technology
that serves the vast opportunities that exist for female health.” See Ida Tin, The
Rise of a New Category: Femtech, CLUE (Sept. 14, 2016), https://helloclue.com/
articles/culture/rise-new-category-femtech [https://perma.cc/9T3K-U4XG].
6
The term “women’s health” is inherently exclusionary and fails to reflect the
fact that “women’s health research is needed by more than just cisgender
women[.]” See Melissa Nelson et al., Beyond the Binary: What Does GenderInclusive Women’s Health Research Look Like?, WOMEN’S HEALTH RSCH. INST.
(Jan. 15, 2020), https://whri.org/beyond-the-binary-what-does-gender-inclusivewomens-health-research-look-like/ [https://perma.cc/CEY8-6YS5]. While gender
inclusive language has been developed for clinical care, the research community
has not yet adopted research-specific inclusive language. See id. This Article uses
gendered terms like “women’s health” and “femtech” to reflect the language used
in cited research while attempting to use inclusive terms where possible and calls
on the research community to put more resources toward developing language
that is inclusive to all.
2
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Part III discusses the urgent need for stronger, more comprehensive
research into women’s health issues and explores possibilities for
using data collected through femtech apps in such research. Part IV
describes the current patchwork of federal laws that provide limited
protection for data collected by femtech apps and explores existing
proposals for privacy reform in the femtech app space. Lastly, Part
V proposes amending the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) to cover femtech apps, a solution
that balances the need for data privacy with the potential to use data
from femtech apps to further critical women’s health research.
II. BACKGROUND: THE RISE OF FEMTECH AND CURRENT
PRIVACY CONCERNS
The femtech market is booming. The term “femtech” was first
introduced in 2016.7 Three years later, “femtech” had secured a
place as one of the top ten “words of the year”8 and the global
femtech market was valued at $18.75 billion.9 Over the next decade,
this figure is estimated to reach $50 to $60 billion.10 Venture capital
investment in the femtech industry has grown considerably in recent

7

See Tin, supra note 5.
David Shariatmadari, Cancelled for Sadfishing: The Top 10 Words of 2019,
THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 14, 2019, 3:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
science/2019/oct/14/cancelled-for-sadfishing-the-top-10-words-of-2019 [https://
perma.cc/VGC7-FMB6] (listing “femtech” as a “key word of the year” alongside
others like “pronoun,” “nanoinfluencer,” and “cancelled”).
9
Femtech Market by Type, by End-Use, by Application, by Region, Forecasts
to 2027, EMERGEN RSCH. (Aug. 2020), https://www.emergenresearch.com/
industry-report/femtech-market [https://perma.cc/MJM6-P8EZ] (predicting an
annual growth rate of 15.6 percent, with 36.7 percent of global growth coming
from the North American market).
10
See id. (noting that the femtech market is predicted to grow at an annual rate
of 15.6% to reach a global market value of $60.01 billion by 2027); see also
Femtech—Time for a Digital Revolution in the Women’s Health Market, FROST
& SULLIVAN (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.frost.com/frost-perspectives/
femtechtime-digital-revolution-womens-health-market/ [https://perma.cc/3FPKV8Z] (predicting that the global market value for femtech will reach $50 billion
by 2025).
8
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years.11 However, there is still significant space for growth as the
male-dominated investment world continues to realize the vast
potential for profit from an industry whose target market comprises
nearly half of the world’s population.12
While the femtech market includes a variety of technologies that
address various aspects of women’s health, including menstruation,
fertility, pregnancy, menopause, geriatric care, and general
wellbeing,13 a large sector of this market consists solely of menstrual
and fertility tracking applications.14 Femtech apps are mobile apps
that “track a user’s reproductive cycle, sex life[,] and health in order
to provide [users] with algorithmically derived insights into their
bod[ies].”15 More than 100 million individuals use these mobile apps
to track their menstrual cycles.16 In 2016, femtech apps represented
the second most popular category of health apps among adolescent

11
See Yelena Lavrentyeva, The Rise of Femtech: Stigma, Market Trends,
Challenges, and Opportunities, ITREX (Apr. 1, 2021), https://itrexgroup.com/
blog/femtech-apps-for-women-trends-challenges/ [https://perma.cc/X9PJ-7UTQ].
12
See id. (“There’s finally an increasing awareness of huge unmet demand.
What were long considered niche needs actually affect roughly half of the global
population—a market of 3.73 billion prospective customers.”); see also
Population, Female (% of Total Population), WORLD BANK (2019),
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL.FE.ZS [https://perma.cc/3Z
P4-BD4G] (estimating that females constitute 49.6% of the global population and
50.5% of the U.S. population).
13
See FROST & SULLIVAN, supra note 10.
14
See Laura Shipp & Jorge Blasco, How Private is Your Period?: A Systematic
Analysis of Menstrual App Privacy Policies, 4 PROC. ON PRIV. ENHANCING
TECHS. 491, 491 (2020). While appreciating the breadth of technologies in the
femtech sector, this Article focuses primarily on menstrual and fertility tracking
apps.
15
Id.
16
Naomi Kresge, Period-Tracking Apps Are Monetizing Women’s Extremely
Personal Data: More Than 100 Million Women Monitor Their Cycles on Their
Phones. Here Come the Ads, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 28, 2019),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-24/how-period-trackingapps-are-monetizing-women-s-extremely-personal-data [https://perma.cc/7M5ZDW67].
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females and the fourth most popular category of health apps among
all adults.17
A 2017 study by the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (“HHS”) found that individuals track their cycles for five
main reasons: (1) overall bodily awareness; (2) understanding their
physical and emotional responses to the different phases of their
cycles; (3) feeling prepared for their cycles; (4) planning for
pregnancy; and, (5) providing information for conversations with
healthcare providers.18 The difficulties of tracking one’s own
menstruation and fertility trends are familiar to anyone with a
menstrual cycle. From discretely marking calendar days to creating
and struggling to keep up with complex spreadsheets, individuals
have long been left to their own devices to track this information.
On top of these inherent difficulties, historically, many cultures have
viewed menstruation as taboo.19 Menstrual health was “something
to only be spoken about in whispers,”20 and while there are some
indications of progress, the societal uncomfortableness surrounding
menstrual health remains a reality with serious consequences,
including loss of educational opportunities.21
17

Michelle L. Moglia et al., Evaluation of Smartphone Menstrual Cycle
Tracking Applications Using an Adapted APPLICATIONS Scoring System, 127
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1153, 1153 (2016).
18
Daniel A. Epstein et al., Examining Menstrual Tracking to Inform the Design
of Personal Informatics Tools, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIGCHI CONFERENCE ON
HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS 6876, 6879 (2017).
19
See Menstruation and Human Rights – Frequently Asked Questions, U.N.
POPULATION FUND (June 2021), https://www.unfpa.org/menstruationfaq
[https://perma.cc/44Q6-BTHY]; Marni Sommer & Diana J. Mason, Period
Poverty and Promoting Menstrual Equity, 2 JAMA HEALTH F. 1, 1 (2021) (“The
stigma associated with menstruation perpetuates a culture of silence that may keep
the issue hidden from policy makers and others positioned to address it.”).
20
See FemTech Founder: An Interview with Clue CEO, Ida Tin,
FEMTECH.LIVE (Feb. 11, 2021), https://femtech.live/femtech-founder-aninterview-with-clue-ceo-ida-tin/ [https://perma.cc/BU6L-5H4B].
21
See, e.g., Sara AlHattab, Breaking the Cycle of Silence – Menstruation
Matters, UNICEF (May 28, 2019), https://www.unicef.org/jordan/stories/
breaking-cycle-silence-menstruation-matters [https://perma.cc/M57H-3W6M].
(explaining that in Jordan, a cultural silence around menstruation causes
embarrassment and shame, leading many young girls to remain home from school
while menstruating).
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Femtech apps provide tools that minimize the inherent difficulty
in tracking one’s menstruation and fertility.22 Moreover, femtech
apps allow users to take more control over their reproductive and
general health, leading to “a greater sense of autonomy[,] which
often goes with improved self-worth.”23 Gaining insights into
reproductive health is particularly important for people who live in
countries where societal pressures and shame prevent young and
unmarried women from seeking reproductive health care.24 Beyond
enabling individuals to better understand their bodies, femtech apps
provide users with important information to communicate to
healthcare providers, supplying clinicians with greater insight into
the often-unrecognized patterns and irregularities of reproductive
health.25 In addition to enhancing the depth of the physician-patient
relationship, femtech apps have the potential to provide women’s
health researchers with copious data on reproductive health—an
area that has been long under-funded and under-studied.26
Despite the promising possibilities for femtech apps to empower
women and enhance the medical community’s understanding of key
women’s health issues, femtech apps present significant data
privacy concerns. These concerns are, in part, due to the fact that the
United States lacks a comprehensive, federal data privacy law.27
While some states have enacted their own privacy legislation,28

22

See Alexandra M. Taylor, Fertile Ground: Rethinking Regulatory Standards
for Femtech, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2267, 2297 (2021).
23
See id. But see Epstein, supra note 18, at 6882–83 (describing how
heteronormative femtech app designs can exacerbate feelings of exclusion for
underrepresented groups, e.g., overly feminine design schemes and sexual
logging features that assume a male sexual partner).
24
See Fatemeh Mohammadi et al., The Stigma of Reproductive Health Services
Utilization by Unmarried Women, 18 IRANIAN RED CRESCENT MED. J. 1, 6 (2016).
25
See Taylor, supra note 22, at 2297; Johanna Levy & Nuria Romo-Avilés, “A
Good Little Tool to Get to Know Yourself a Bit Better”: A Qualitative Study on
Users’ Experiences of App-Supported Menstrual Tracking in Europe, 19 BMC
PUB. HEALTH 1, 6 (2019).
26
See INST. MED. NAT’L ACADS., WOMEN’S HEALTH RESEARCH: PROGRESS,
PITFALLS, AND PROMISE (2010) (ebook), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
books/NBK210143/ [https://perma.cc/A7TD-ZBES].
27
See Keats Citron, supra note 4, at 1804–05.
28
See, e.g., id. at 1805, 1807–09.
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femtech apps remain largely unregulated in terms of data privacy
and security.29
Concerns about the lack of privacy protections for apps that
collect personally identifiable information span across industries
and are not limited to femtech.30 However, an app that collects data
on grocery purchasing habits31 arguably presents less-serious
privacy concerns than an app that collects data on a person’s sexual
history and identifies their peak fertility windows.32 Although
femtech apps have the potential to give women increased control
over their reproductive health, the unique nature of the highly
personal data collected by femtech apps, coupled with the current
lack of federal privacy regulations, presents a strong case for the
necessity of heightened protections.
Femtech apps routinely collect data about users’ bodies,
“particularly the parts of the body associated with sex, gender,
sexuality, and reproduction.”33 When app companies sell this
information to third parties without users’ consent—which they are
incentivized to do, given the potential for profit and the lack of
regulations to prevent this type of action—they intrude into, what
privacy law expert Danielle Keats Citron refers to as, an individual’s
right to sexual or intimate privacy.34 Users of femtech apps may
29

See Rosas, supra note 3, at 323.
See Keats Citron, supra note 4, at 1817.
31
See, e.g., Instacart: Grocery Deliveries, APPLE APP STORE,
https://apps.apple.com/us/app/instacart-grocery-deliveries/id545599256
[https://perma.cc/RG4J-5D5X].
32
See, e.g., Period Tracker Period Calendar, APPLE APP STORE,
https://apps.apple.com/us/app/period-tracker-period-calendar/id896501514
[https://perma.cc/YF8B-7CQS]; Clue Period & Cycle Tracker, APPLE APP
STORE,
https://apps.apple.com/us/app/clue-period-cycle-tracker/id657189652
[https://perma.cc/AJF3-7BM8]; Flo Period & Ovulation Tracker, APPLE APP
STORE, https://apps.apple.com/us/app/flo-period-ovulation-tracker/id1038369065
[https://perma.cc/34ML-R2AF]; Period Tracker – Eve, APPLE APP STORE,
https://apps.apple.com/tc/app/period-tracker-eve/id1002275138 [https://perma.cc/7B
RJ-ML7Z].
33
See Keats Citron, supra note 4, at 1768.
34
See id. (“Sexual privacy allows people to set the boundaries around their
intimate lives. With sexual privacy, people enjoy sexual autonomy. They get to
decide who learns about their innermost fantasies, sexual history, and sexual and
reproductive health.”); id. at 1793; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
30
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share general health-related data, like their weight, mood, activity
levels, or smoking habits, along with much more sensitive and
intimate data like menstrual irregularities, bodily secretions, sexual
activity, sexual desires, and history of sexual assault, miscarriages,
abortions, and more.35 Additionally, some femtech companies are
now pairing apps with data-tracking devices, like digital menstrual
cups, vaginal thermometers, and portable ultrasound devices.36
Unfortunately, many femtech app users are not aware that the
personal data they share is essentially unprotected.37 In a 2020 study,
researchers at the Health Law and Policy Institute found that none
of the fifteen most popular menstrual-tracking apps required users
to view the apps’ terms of service or privacy policies prior to use.38
Additionally, users who did access these documents needed a
college-level education to read (let alone, fully comprehend) the
average app’s terms of service and privacy policies.39 Nevertheless,
many users of menstrual-tracking apps assume that their data is kept
private.40
The lack of privacy and security protections poses serious
consequences for users of femtech apps, and it is becoming
increasingly clear that data collected by femtech apps have not been
safeguarded in ways that meet users’ assumptions. To start, femtech
479, 485–86 (1965) (recognizing a fundamental right to privacy in intimate
marital decisions); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (extending the
fundamental right to intimate privacy recognized in Griswold to unmarried people
and noting that, “[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual . . . to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child”); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153–54 (1973) (holding that a woman has a
fundamental, albeit qualified, right to make personal reproductive health
decisions).
35
See Keats Citron, supra note 4, at 1775–77.
36
Id. at 1777; Bob Kronemyer, Femtech Health Technology Takes Center
Stage, CONTEMP. OB/GYN 23, 23 (2018).
37
See Leah R. Fowler et al., Readability and Accessibility of Terms of Service
and Privacy Policies for Menstruation-Tracking Smartphone Applications, 21
HEALTH PROMOTION PRAC. 679, 680–81 (2020).
38
Id.
39
Id. at 681.
40
See id. at 680 (stating that femtech app users often erroneously assume that
the data they use these apps to track is kept private).
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app companies often sell user data to third parties, which in turn sell
that information to data aggregators or brokers.41 A recent study of
ten popular femtech apps found that those apps sold user data to over
135 companies, including Facebook and Amazon, as well as firms
specializing in targeted advertisements.42 Shockingly, there have
even been instances of employers gaining access to their employees’
data from femtech apps.43 Without femtech app users’ knowledge,
their intimate data is used to “train algorithms used in hiring,
housing, insurance, and other crucial decisions.”44 Such algorithms
can predict that an individual may need costly fertility treatments or
may consider undergoing gender confirmation surgery in the future,
potentially increasing that individual’s insurance premiums.45
Further, the negative personal outcomes that arise when femtech app
developers sell user data to third parties may be felt
disproportionately by women, non-white people, and the LGBTQ
community.46 Putting intimate personal data into the hands of private
parties without user consent deprives individuals of the autonomy to
control who may access the most intimate details of their lives.47
Several recent examples illustrate the serious consequences that
can occur when femtech apps are left unregulated. First, a Wall
Street Journal investigation found that Flo Health, maker of the Flo
Period & Ovulation Tracker, repeatedly profited through supplying
third parties, including Google and Facebook, with unrestricted use
of its users’ intimate, personal data.48 Data sold to third parties
included dates of a user’s menstrual cycles, as well as whether and
when a user was attempting to conceive.49 One can imagine why any
person, especially one who has suffered a miscarriage or undergone
an abortion, might not want to receive targeted advertisements using
41

See Keats Citron, supra note 4, at 1799.
See id. at 1805.
43
See id. at 1798.
44
Id. at 1799.
45
See id. at 1770.
46
See id. at 1796 (noting that while white men are often celebrated for their
sexual activities and desires, “women, racial minorities, and LGBTQ individuals
are stigmatized, marginalized, and disempowered”).
47
Id. at 1793.
48
See Complaint, In re Flo Health, Inc., Docket No. 1923133, ¶ 5.
49
See Keats Citron, supra note 4, at 1777.
42
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that data. Another femtech app, FEMM, a self-described “new
revolution in women’s health” that “uses cutting edge science,” was
created by an anti-abortion advocacy group.50 Consequently, FEMM
advises its users that taking birth control is unsafe and discourages
them from seeking abortions, regardless of medical necessity.51
However, information about the company’s anti-abortion stance is
not affirmatively disclosed to users.52
Additionally, a recent Consumer Reports investigation
uncovered several security threats to user data on the popular Glow
app.53 Consumer Reports found a number of “surprising
vulnerabilities” that could allow “stalkers, online bullies, or identity
thieves to use the information they gathered to harm Glow’s [four
million] users.”54 Perhaps most alarmingly, anyone who knew a
Glow user’s email address—whether a “loving partner, obsessive
ex-husband, or anonymous creep”—could link accounts without
that user’s permission or knowledge.55 By simply requesting to link
accounts, any person could immediately gain access to the user’s
data, “including the dates of abortions and sexual encounters.”56 The
investigation uncovered another disconcerting vulnerability through
which anyone who downloaded free, easy-to-use software could
click on any Glow user’s posts to one of the app’s forums and access
50

See id. at 1803.
See id. at 1804.
52
See id.
53
See Jerry Beilinson, Glow Pregnancy App Exposed Women to Privacy
Threats, Consumer Reports Finds, CONSUMER REPS. (Sept. 17, 2020),
https://www.consumerreports.org/mobile-security-software/glow-pregnancyapp-exposed-women-to-privacy-threats-a1100919965/ [https://perma.cc/M69GQ8K9]; see also Glow Period, Fertility Tracker, APPLE APP STORE,
https://apps.apple.com/us/app/glow-period-fertility-tracker/id638021335 [https://
perma.cc/P3JU-77TR] (describing Glow as a fertility and period tracker that aids
in conception and gives users control over their reproductive health by recording
information on basal body temperature, cervical mucus, menstrual flow,
pregnancy test results, sexual activity, height, weight, sleep patterns, and more).
54
Beilinson, supra note 53.
55
See id. (noting that a request to link accounts is sent to the user, but no action
is required on her part; therefore, if the request email ends up in her spam folder
or if she never opens it, the requesting party has automatic access to much of her
data).
56
See Keats Citron, supra note 4, at 1777.
51
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that user’s name, email address, approximate location, “and a
number of details from her health log.”57 Following the Consumer
Reports investigation, Glow updated its app to address all of these
vulnerabilities and notified users about the updates.58 While Glow’s
security issues are alarming, perhaps they are not surprising given
that Hard Valuable Fun (“HVF”), the developer of Glow and other
femtech apps, describes one of its objectives as “tak[ing] advantage
of . . . high storage capacity to collect and explore data as a
commodity.”59 The current paucity of data privacy laws serves only
to encourage this type of profit-seeking behavior, leaving app users
with little to no recourse, aside from choosing not to use femtech
apps.60
III. PROMISING CAPABILITIES: THE POTENTIAL FOR DATA
COLLECTED BY FEMTECH APPS TO FILL CRITICAL WOMEN’S
HEALTH RESEARCH GAPS
The potential for femtech apps to provide individuals and
healthcare providers with more information about women’s health
is valuable, given the historical lack of focus and funding directed
toward women’s health research in the United States.61 Women have
been chronically underrepresented in studies of disease progression
and treatment, leaving healthcare providers uncertain regarding how
best to predict risk and prescribe proper treatment to female
patients.62 Today, approximately one-third of women in the United
States have used a femtech app during their lifetime.63 In 2016,
seven-percent of the apps available to download in Apple’s App
Store were femtech apps.64 With such widespread use, femtech apps
have the potential to provide a novel source of aggregated data on
reproductive health that could benefit public health research and
improve women’s health outcomes.
57

See Beilinson, supra note 53.
See id.
59
See Keats Citron, supra note 4, at 1777; see also Beilinson, supra note 53.
60
See Keats Citron, supra note 4, at 1767.
61
See INST. MED. NAT’L ACADS., supra note 26.
62
See Anna Nowogrodzki, Inequality in Medicine, 550 NATURE S18 (2017).
63
Keats Citron, supra note 4, at 1775.
64
See Moglia et al., supra note 15, at 1153.
58
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A. Women Are Critically Underrepresented in Medical Research
Until the 1970’s, women were excluded from clinical trials in
the United States because of the widespread belief throughout the
medical community that their menstrual cycles could bias study
results in unpredictable ways that could not be statistically
adjusted.65 The federal government has undertaken efforts in recent
years to increase the number of women included in public health
research.66 Despite these efforts, women remain underrepresented,
particularly in studies of disease progression and treatment.67 For
example, only one-third of participants in cardiovascular clinical
trials are women, despite the fact that cardiovascular disease is the
leading cause of death for American women.68 Furthermore, the
under-inclusion of women in research begins before the clinical trial
phase; preclinical drug trials in animals are heavily biased toward
males.69 Some animal studies include no females at all, while others
report a male-to-female ratio of sixteen-to-one.70 As Georgetown
University researcher Kathryn Sandberg notes, this “bias[es] the
whole drug pipeline toward what is optimal in the male.”71
As more women have been included in clinical studies over the
years, significant sex differences have emerged—differences in
drug reactions, pain processing, and risk factors for certain
diseases.72 For example, studies including women have revealed
significant sex-based differences in the prevalence of and treatment
for cardiovascular disease, lung cancer, depression, and Alzheimer’s
disease.73 However, even when women are included in clinical trials,
many studies do not separately analyze data by sex or report any
65

See Ruth B. Merkatz, Inclusion of Women in Clinical Trials: A Historical
Overview of Scientific, Ethical, and Legal Issues, 27 J. OBSTETRIC, GYNECOLOGIC
& NEONATAL NURSING 78, 78–79 (1998).
66
See Paula A. Johnson et al., Sex-Specific Medical Research: Why Women’s
Health Can’t Wait, MARY HORRIGAN CONNORS CTR. WOMEN’S HEALTH &
GENDER BIOLOGY BRIGHAM WOMEN’S HOSP. 1, 5 (2014).
67
See id.; see also Nowogrodzki, supra note 62, at S18.
68
See Johnson, supra note 66, at 5, 12.
69
See Nowogrodzki, supra note 62, at S18–19.
70
See id. at S19.
71
See id.
72
See id.
73
See Johnson, supra note 66, at 5.
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sex-based differences in their results.74 Additionally, many
pharmaceuticals are less effective in women, and women are more
likely to experience adverse drug-related reactions.75 Nonetheless,
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) does not require
sex-specific data analyses from drug trials before making dosing
recommendations.76
The under-inclusion of women in medical research has left
healthcare providers without comprehensive—or even adequate—
data regarding women’s health, limiting their ability to provide
high-quality, evidence-based care.77 Providers face critical gaps in
their understanding of how to best prevent and treat many diseases
and illnesses prevalent in women patients.78 In addition to the
“deeply rooted” underrepresentation of women in medical
research,79 a history of political resistance against women’s
reproductive agency, along with reproductive health taboos, has
caused major gaps in knowledge about reproductive health.80
B. Data Collected by Femtech Apps Can Fill Critical Research
Gaps
Given these persisting gaps in medical knowledge about
women’s health, femtech apps have the potential to provide
healthcare professionals with unprecedented amounts of data to
advance critical insights into women’s health. The ease and
convenience of using an app to collect data (as opposed to visiting a
research site) may allow for the inclusion of women who would

74

See id. at 8; see also Nowogrodzki, supra note 62, at S18 (noting that only
31% of cardiovascular clinical trials stratify their results by sex).
75
See Nowogrodzki, supra note 62, at S18 (explaining that between 1997 and
2000, 80% of drugs removed from the U.S. pharmaceutical market were removed
due to adverse effects in women).
76
See Johnson, supra note 66, at 8.
77
See id. at 5.
78
See Nowogrodzki, supra note 62, at S18.
79
Id.
80
See Clara Moskowitz, Fertile Ground: The Long-Neglected Science of
Female Reproductive Health, SCI. AM. (May 1, 2019), https://
www.scientificamerican.com/article/fertile-ground-the-long-neglected-scienceof-female-reproductive-health/ [https://perma.cc/4MRH-WAM7].
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otherwise be unable to participate in clinical research studies.81
Apart from clinical trials, the large number of women who use
femtech apps presents the opportunity for large-scale observational
studies of important reproductive health trends.82
Research on the recently developed COVID-19 vaccine
provides an illustrative example of the potential of femtech apps to
fill knowledge gaps that arise when researchers fail to consider
women’s health outcomes.83 After receiving a COVID-19 vaccine,
numerous individuals used social media to chronicle temporary
changes to their menstrual cycles.84 However, none of the clinical
trials for the COVID-19 vaccines collected data about the
relationship between vaccination and menstruation.85 Furthermore,
HHS’s online system for reporting adverse events associated with
COVID-19 vaccination did not collect any information about
menstrual cycle outcomes.86 This lack of data has left healthcare
providers unable to properly advise patients about any menstrual
changes they might expect post-vaccination.87 To begin to fill this
research gap, a forthcoming study funded by the National Institutes
of Health (“NIH”) used data collected through the femtech app,
Natural Cycles, to analyze the correlation between COVID-19

81

See Nicole Wetsman, Data from Health Apps Offers Opportunities and
Obstacles to Researchers, VERGE (July 3, 2019, 3:09 PM), https://
www.theverge.com/2019/7/3/20681254/data-health-apps-clue-period-trackingsleep-fitness-research [https://perma.cc/M6H2-6JMP].
82
See, e.g., Anna Druet, Scientific Research at Clue: How Tracking Your Cycle
Advances Female Health, CLUE (Mar. 27, 2018), https://helloclue.com/
articles/about-clue/scientific-research-at-clue [https://perma.cc/H34P-AMRB]
(describing a collaboration between the Clue app and researchers at Columbia
University as, “in essence[,] the largest observational study about menstrual
health . . . [that] will shed new light on the menstrual cycle and its phenotypic
variations”).
83
See Alison Edelman et al., Association Between Menstrual Cycle Length and
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Vaccination, OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 1–2).
84
See id. at 2.
85
Id.
86
See id.
87
Id.
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vaccination and menstrual cycle disturbances.88 The Natural Cycles
study found that, although vaccination was occasionally associated
with a longer menstrual cycle, this change was temporary and not
“clinically meaningful.”89 This study highlights the potential to use
data collected through femtech apps to support research into
women’s health outcomes that are too often overlooked.
Consequently, any proposal to strengthen privacy protections for
data collected by femtech apps should also consider how to
incorporate the possibility of giving users the ability to opt into
research studies while keeping their data protected.
IV. THE NEED FOR STRONGER LEGAL PROTECTIONS OF
PERSONAL DATA COLLECTED BY FEMTECH APPS
In today’s increasingly digital world, mobile applications
constantly collect data about all aspects of human life. Public
concern about how this data is used and sold is intensifying,
accompanied by demands for comprehensive data privacy
legislation.90 Data collected by femtech apps raise heightened
concerns about privacy because these apps track a unique mix of
highly-sensitive data, including general and reproductive health
information and users’ sexual practices.91 Despite the intimate,
personal nature of data collected by and stored on femtech apps, few
laws protect the privacy and security of such data in the United
States.92
Three federal agencies have limited regulatory authority over
femtech apps regarding data privacy and security—the Federal
Trade Commission (“FTC”), the FDA, and the HHS. However, all
88

See id. (“Individuals who use . . . Natural Cycles voluntarily choose to
prospectively track physiologic data related to their menstrual cycles for purposes
of nonhormonal pregnancy prevention or planning and consent to the use of their
de-identified data for research (consent can be removed if desired).”). The Natural
Cycles app prompted users to enter their COVID-19 vaccination status and
corresponding dates of vaccination. See id. If app users did not enter this
information, they were excluded from the study. Id.
89
See id. at 8.
90
See Keats Citron, supra note 4, at 1838.
91
See Shipp & Blasco, supra note 14, at 491.
92
See Keats Citron, supra note 4, at 1804.
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three agencies have narrow authority to regulate only certain apps
or activities. This assortment of inadequate federal oversight leaves
many femtech apps completely unregulated when it comes to how
the apps store, use, and share personal data. In addition to federal
regulations, some states have unilaterally passed laws that provide
stronger privacy and security protections.93 This patchwork of
federal and state laws has led to confusion about the laws with which
femtech app makers must comply and leaves users in the dark about
the safety of their personal reproductive health information. Given
these concerns, several legal scholars have described proposals for
strengthening privacy protections for data collected by apps in the
rapidly expanding femtech market.94
A. Current Federal Privacy Laws Regulating Femtech Apps
First, femtech apps are subject to FTC oversight.95 Section 5(a)
of the FTC Act prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce.”96 In practice, the FTC Act prohibits femtech
app companies from “mislead[ing] consumers about what is
happening with their health information.”97 To comply, the FTC
discourages app companies from burying any privacy information
in a way that makes it difficult for consumers to understand or
providing consumers with contradictory information about data
privacy.98 Additionally, the FTC’s Health Breach Notification Rule
(“HBNR”) requires femtech apps to notify users if any data breach
occurs involving their personal information.99 Importantly, however,
the FTC Act merely ensures that users receive notice about an app
provider’s data policies and any breaches of those policies regarding
the storing or usage of user’s data, but the Act does not, in fact,
93

See Rosas, supra note 3, at 336.
See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 22; Rosas, supra note 3; Keats Citron, supra note 4.
95
See Rosas, supra note 3, at 323.
96
15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2006).
97
Sharing Consumer Health Information? Look to HIPAA and the FTC Act,
FED. TRADE COMM’N (Oct. 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/businesscenter/guidance/sharing-consumer-health-information-look-hipaa-ftc-act [https://
perma.cc/2Z3P-GNQC].
98
See id.
99
Id.; see also 16 C.F.R. § 318 (2009). The HBNR also requires an app
company to notify the media of any breach involving 500 or more consumers. Id.
94
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provide any meaningful protection for a user’s information.100
Furthermore, FTC enforcement in the femtech app industry has thus
far been extremely limited.101
Second, the FDA, which is statutorily obligated to protect public
health, has regulatory authority over medical devices, including
mobile medical apps (“MMAs”).102 However, the Agency has taken
a largely “hands-off” approach to regulating femtech apps based on
the way the Agency classifies risks posed by MMAs.103 Typically,
the FDA categorizes medical devices into “classes” based on the
level of public health risk involved—i.e., as the level of risk
increases, so too does the degree of regulatory control required.104
However, before placing MMAs into one of the traditional risk
“classes,” the FDA places these apps into two categories: (1) apps
that turn smartphones into medical devices and therefore may pose
risks to users “if they function improperly,” and (2) apps that may
be classified as “medical devices” but nonetheless pose only a low
or moderate risk to users.105 If an MMA is in the first category, it is
placed into a risk-based “class” and is subject to full FDA
100
See Rosas, supra note 3, at 334 (asserting that the FTC Act does not provide
adequate privacy and security protections for femtech apps in part because the Act
“does not regulate the manners, mechanisms, and means of how a company’s
technological infrastructure must operate to ensure consumer’s privacy rights are
upheld”).
101
See F.T.C., Joint Statement of Comm’r Rohit Chopra and Comm’r Rebecca
Kelly Slaughter: In re Flo Health, Inc. Comm’n File No. 1923133 at 1 (Jan. 13,
2021) (remarking that the FTC’s proposed complaint against Flo Health did not
include a violation of the HBNR when the Agency had the authority to do so and
calling for more stringent enforcement utilizing all of FTC’s available
enforcement mechanisms).
102
See Taylor, supra note 22, at 2277, 2280.
103
See id. at 2270, 2277.
104
See Classify Your Medical Device, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/overview-device-regulation/classify-yourmedical-device [https://perma.cc/6GRG-6JW2] (stating Class I devices pose the
lowest risk and are subject to the least regulation, while Class III devices have the
highest level of risk and are subject to the strictest regulations); see also Taylor,
supra note 22, at 2270, 2277.
105
See Taylor, supra note 22, at 2281 (noting that apps which primarily “offer
patient education or serve as reference aids” are deemed to pose only a low to
moderate risk to public health).
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regulation.106 However, if an MMA falls in the second category, it is
only subject to the FDA’s “enforcement discretion,” as opposed to
full agency regulation.107 Despite the fact that many femtech apps
pose significant risks to users if they function improperly (e.g., by
providing inaccurate fertility predictions leading to unplanned
pregnancies),108 the FDA has failed to exercise regulatory authority
over most of these apps.109
This lack of FDA regulation is not accidental; through recent
legislation, Congress sought to decrease the “regulatory burdens”
associated with app development in an effort to drive marketplace
innovation and technological advancement, and FDA guidance
reflects these goals.110 The 21st Century Cures Act (“Cures Act”)
along with the 2017 Digital Health Innovation Action Plan
(“Innovation Plan”) make clear that the FDA will only regulate
“high-risk MMAs” as medical devices.111 The shared aim of the
Cures Act and the Innovation Plan is to promote mobile health
innovation, allowing apps to reach the market faster.112 One result of
this goal is the FDA’s hands-off approach to regulating femtech
apps.113
Third, HHS is tasked with enforcing HIPAA, which was enacted
in 1996114—well before smartphones or data-collecting apps were

106

See id.
See id.
108
See id. at 2276 (describing an investigation of the Natural Cycles app in
Sweden, which found that at least 676 of the apps’ users had unintended
pregnancies and thirty-seven users sought abortions at a single clinic during a
four-month period).
109
See id. at 2283–86.
110
See id. at 2280–83.
111
See id. at 2281–83 (“The Digital Health Innovation Action Plan and the [21st
Century] Cures Act together reflect the fundamental tension between the FDA’s
core responsibilities. The Agency must balance the need for innovation and
efficiency in the approval process with the need to provide patients with treatment
options that are backed by proven safety and efficacy data.”).
112
See id.
113
See id.
114
Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
(2003).
107
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ubiquitous.115 As a part of the Social Security Act, HIPAA was
originally enacted to protect individuals who lose or change
employment from simultaneously losing all healthcare coverage.116
Title II of HIPAA requires HHS to promote efficiency in the storage
and transmission of patient data or protected health information
(“PHI”) and, to this end, encourages PHI to be stored
electronically.117 Title II also includes HIPAA’s Privacy Rule,
Security Rule, and Breach Notification Rule.118 HHS’s Office of
Civil Rights (“OCR”) is responsible for enforcing these rules.119
Thus, even though HIPAA is not a privacy bill per se, the Act has
developed to provide expansive privacy protections for PHI.120
Unfortunately, however, most femtech apps are not required to
comply with HIPAA’s privacy and security regulations.121
HIPAA defines PHI as “individually identifiable health
information” in any form (including electronic) that is maintained
or transmitted by a covered entity.122 “Individually identifiable
health information” includes any data related to someone’s “past,
present[,] or future physical or mental health condition.”123 Although
many femtech apps regularly collect “individually identifiable
115

See, e.g., Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 7, 2021),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/mobile/
[https://perma.cc/T3HX-KB6A] (citing data from Pew Research Center’s first
smartphone ownership survey in 2011, fifteen years after HIPAA was first
enacted, which found that only thirty-five percent of U.S. adults owned a
smartphone, compared to eighty-five percent of U.S. adults in 2020); Matt Strain,
1983 to Today: A History of Mobile Apps, GUARDIAN (Feb. 13, 2015, 6:00 EST),
https://www.theguardian.com/media-network/2015/feb/13/history-mobile-appsfuture-interactive-timeline [https://perma.cc/F55S-K3Z5] (noting that, while
early PDAs like the Nokia 6110 had built in games like ‘Snake,’ the modern app
emerged when Apple introduced the first 500 apps in 2008).
116
See Donna Bowers, The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act: Is It Really All That Bad?, 14 PROC. BAYLOR UNIV. MED. CTR. 347, 347
(2001).
117
See id.
118
See id.
119
See 45 C.F.R. § 160.
120
See Keats Citron, supra note 4, at 1806.
121
See Rosas, supra note 3, at 323.
122
See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.
123
See id.
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health information,”124 most smartphone apps do not meet HIPAA’s
narrow definition of “covered entity.”125 HIPAA applies to three
categories of entities: (1) health plans; (2) health plan
clearinghouses; and, (3) healthcare providers that electronically
transmit certain PHI, and also applies to the business associates of
any covered entity.126 A small number femtech apps are considered
business associates of covered entities and are therefore subject to
HIPAA compliance.127 For example, the Glow app allows its users
to participate in a program through which the app communicates
fertility information between patients and healthcare providers.128
Glow is thus considered a business associate under HIPAA and must
comply with certain privacy and security regulations.129 To the
contrary, any femtech app not considered a business associate of a
covered entity falls outside the regulatory scope of HIPAA.130
B. Strengthening Privacy Protections: Existing Proposals for
Reform
The uniquely intimate nature of the data collected by femtech
apps poses distinct risks to users.131 These risks accordingly call for
unique legal solutions. As femtech apps grow in popularity, so do
concerns over how app developers are using and could use this data
at the expense of their users.132 Legal scholarship focusing on this
issue is new and developing. Some proposed solutions suggest
amending or expanding current federal laws to provide greater
privacy protections.133 Additionally, federal and state lawmakers
have recently proposed legislation addressing certain aspects of data
124

See Rosas, supra note 3, at 329 (noting that “[f]emtech mobile applications
and medical records often contain the same level of personal health information”).
125
See id. at 323.
126
See id.
127
See id. at 325–26.
128
See id. (describing the “Glow Fertility Program Patient Services
Agreement”).
129
See id.
130
See id. at 322–23.
131
See Fowler et al., supra note 37, at 680.
132
See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 22; Rosas, supra note 3; Keats Citron, supra
note 4.
133
See, e.g., id.
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privacy, and federal agencies have begun to exercise enforcement
over femtech apps in response to egregious privacy violations.134
Below are several suggestions for how current and proposed federal
laws could strengthen data privacy protections for femtech app
users, along with potential challenges and drawbacks to each
approach.
1. Using Existing Enforcement Mechanisms Under the FTC
The FTC could exercise greater enforcement control over
femtech apps under the FTC Act, which prohibits companies that
collect health-related data from “mislead[ing] consumers about the
companies’ privacy and data security policies” related to PHI.135 A
groundbreaking FTC action against a popular femtech company, Flo
Health, Inc. (“Flo Health”), illustrates that the FTC may be willing
to hold femtech companies accountable for failing to provide notice
to users before disclosing their data to third parties.136 Additionally,
a recent FTC policy statement makes clear that the Agency will
increase enforcement of its HBNR, specifically as the Rule applies
to apps that collect health data.137
In January 2021, the FTC ordered Flo Health, a femtech
company that advertises and sells the Flo Period & Ovulation
Tracker (“Flo App”),138 to notify its users that their data had been
shared with third parties without their knowledge or consent.139
According to the FTC complaint, millions of women who use the
Flo App140 entrusted Flo Health with their intimate reproductive
134

See Keats Citron, supra note 4, at 1807–10; see also Revisiting the Need
for Federal Data Privacy Legislation, Hearing Before the Comm. on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, 116th Cong. (Sept. 23, 2020).
135
See Rosas, supra note 3, at 323, 334.
136
See Complaint, In re Flo Health, Inc., Docket No. 1923133.
137
See F.T.C., Statement of the Commission on Breaches by Health Apps and
Other Connected Devices (Sept. 15, 2021).
138
See Complaint, In re Flo Health, Inc., Docket No. 1923133, ¶ 2.
139
See F.T.C., Joint Statement of Comm’r Rohit Chopra and Comm’r Rebecca
Kelly Slaughter In re Flo Health, Inc., Comm’n File No. 1923133, at 1 (Jan. 13,
2021) (concurring in part, dissenting in part).
140
See Complaint, In re Flo Health, Inc., Docket No. 1923133, ¶ 9 (identifying
that Flo App users include over 16 million users in the U.S. and that the Flo App
was the Apple App Store’s “most downloaded app” in 2019).
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health data.141 Flo Health’s privacy policies repeatedly stated that the
app would not share users’ health information with anyone and
“would only use Flo App users’ data to provide the Flo App’s
services.”142 However, for several years, Flo Health provided a
number of third parties (such as Google and Facebook) with
unrestricted access to user data, including information about
menstruation, fertility, and childbirth.143 The FTC charged Flo
Health with seven counts of misrepresentation in violation of the
FTC Act.144 Flo Health reached a settlement with the FTC in June of
2021.145 Under the settlement terms, Flo Health is now required to
notify all affected app users about the disclosure of their health
data.146 Flo Health must undergo an independent review of its
privacy policies, and, going forward, the company will have to
obtain users’ affirmative consent before sharing any data with third
parties.147 This significant action suggests that the FTC may be more
willing in the future to hold similar femtech app companies
accountable for selling or disclosing user data without their consent.
At a minimum, this action signals to other femtech app companies
that they should take care to protect their users’ information or, at
the very least, request consent from their users prior to disclosing
health data to third parties.
After the FTC filed its complaint against Flo Health, two FTC
Commissioners, Rohit Chopra and Rebecca Kelly Slaughter, filed a
Joint Statement, concurring with the FTC’s action but expressing
disappointment that the Agency failed to employ all of its available
141

See id. ¶ 3.
See id. ¶ 13.
143
See id. ¶¶ 3–6 (noting that Flo Health did nothing “to limit what these
companies could do with the users’ information[,]” thereby giving third parties
unrestricted access to “use Flo App users’ personal health information
expansively, including for advertising”).
144
See id. ¶¶ 56–65.
145
See FTC Finalizes Order with Flo Health, a Fertility-Tracking App that
Shared Sensitive Health Data with Facebook, Google, and Others, FED. TRADE
COMM’N (June 22, 2021), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2021/
06/ftc-finalizes-order-flo-health-fertility-tracking-app-shared [https://perma.cc/
C94A-YY2E].
146
See id.
147
See id.
142
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enforcement mechanisms.148 Specifically, the Commissioners
argued that, in addition to FTC’s unprecedented privacy action
against Flo Health, the Agency should have held Flo Health
accountable for violating the HBNR, “one of only a handful of
federal privacy laws protecting consumers.”149 The HBNR requires
mobile health apps (“mHealth apps”) that collect personal health
data to notify users of any unauthorized data disclosures.150
However, as the Commissioners critically noted, the FTC has never
brought an action to enforce this Rule.151
Perhaps in response to Chopra and Slaughter’s Joint Statement,
the FTC released a policy statement on September 15, 2021, to
provide guidance, clarify misunderstandings, and notify mHealth
apps about the scope and requirements of the HBNR.152 In its
statement, the FTC noted that the HBNR is increasingly important
given “the proliferation of apps and connected devices that capture
sensitive health data.”153 The statement clarified that, although apps
are only subject to the Rule if they create a “personal health record”
with data drawn from “multiple sources,” the FTC interprets this
requirement broadly to cover most health apps.154 The FTC further
illuminated that a “breach” under the HBNR includes any
unauthorized sharing of an app user’s health data and “is not limited
to cybersecurity intrusions or nefarious behavior.”155 Finally, the
FTC warned that the Agency intends to bring enforcement actions
148

See F.T.C., Joint Statement of Comm’r Rohit Chopra and Comm’r Rebecca
Kelly Slaughter In re Flo Health, Inc., Comm’n File No. 1923133, at 1 (Jan. 13,
2021) (concurring in part, dissenting in part).
149
See id. at 1–2.
150
Id. at 2.
151
See id. at 3 (suggesting that the FTC should use all of its available authority
to prevent data abuse and stating that the HBNR “will have its intended effect
only if the FTC is willing to enforce it”).
152
See F.T.C., Statement of the Comm’n on Breaches by Health Apps and
Other Connected Devices, at 1 (Sept. 15, 2021).
153
See id.
154
See id. at 2 (clarifying that an app meets the “multiple sources” requirement
if it (1) draws personal health data from user input and has the ability to sync with
a user’s fitness tracker or (2) only draws health information from one source, “but
also takes non-health information from another source (e.g., dates from your
phone’s calendar)”).
155
See id.
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against mHealth apps under the HBNR for any violations that will
result in “civil penalties of $43,792 per violation per day.”156
Hopefully, the threat of such substantial penalties will lead femtech
app developers to rethink their privacy policies.
While heartening that the FTC has recently recognized the
importance of holding mHealth apps more accountable than the
Agency has been willing to do in the past, the FTC’s regulatory
authority remains too limited, given the extremely sensitive nature
of data collected by femtech apps. The FTC could require femtech
apps to develop informative privacy policies and ensure users are
notified if a data breach occurs. However, the Agency’s authority is
limited to bringing enforcement actions only after a breach occurs,157
at which point—particularly from the app user’s perspective—the
damage has already occurred. While the FTC’s settlement with Flo
Health required the company to “instruct any third party that
received users’ health information to destroy that data[,]” the
settlement provides little solace for app users with no knowledge as
to how their reproductive health data was used and no assurance
regarding if or when their data will be destroyed.158
2. Regulating Certain Femtech Apps as “Medical Devices” Under
the FDA
Although the FDA currently regulates only femtech apps that
pose significant risks to users, its recent action indicates it might be
possible to bring more femtech apps under full FDA regulation.159
Rapid technological advancements in femtech app development,
like the ability to take internal body temperatures and predict fertile
and non-fertile windows as a means of contraception, make these
apps more likely to pose risks to users if the apps function

156

Id.
See 16 C.F.R. §§ 318.3(a), 318.7 (2022).
158
See FTC Finalizes Order with Flo Health, a Fertility-Tracking App that
Shared Sensitive Health Data with Facebook, Google, and Others, U.S. FED.
TRADE COMM’N (June 22, 2021), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2021/06/ftc-finalizes-order-flo-health-fertility-tracking-app-shared
[https://perma.cc/C94A-YY2E].
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See Taylor, supra note 22, at 2281.
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improperly.160 For example, in 2018, Natural Cycles became the first
femtech app to obtain FDA approval as a digital contraceptive.161 As
part of the Agency’s approval process, the FDA created a new
category of medical devices subject to regulatory control, called
Software Applications for Contraception (“SACs”).162
The FDA defines SACs as apps that algorithmically analyze user
data (e.g., internal temperature and dates of menstruation) to provide
personalized fertility predictions for contraceptive purposes.163
SACs are categorized as “moderate risk” devices, which subjects
them to certain device-specific regulatory controls, including
“performance standards, postmarket surveillance, and premarket
data requirements.”164 Several femtech apps currently give
personalized fertility predictions and are advertised as
contraceptives,165 meaning the apps fall within the FDA’s definition
of SACs and, following the example of Natural Cycles, should be
subject to full FDA regulation as “medical devices.”166
While classifying more apps as SACs could expand FDA
regulation in the femtech market, this approach has several
limitations. First, the FDA’s regulatory controls primarily focus on
the public health risks inherent in apps that purport to tell users if
and when they might become pregnant.167 To be clear, as an agency
charged with protecting public health, the FDA’s regulations
160

See id. at 2283–86 (“While [some femtech] apps do have ‘low risk’ features
that serve to educate women about their menstrual cycles or allow them to monitor
their personal health data, they are undeniably marketed and meant to be used as
contraceptives . . . .”).
161
See id. at 2270. Natural Cycles is a femtech app that is advertised as a
contraceptive and analyzes user input data to predict “fertility status.” See id. at
2269, 2276.
162
Id. at 2279–80.
163
Id. at 2278.
164
Id. at 2270, 2279.
165
See id. at 2283 (suggesting that unregulated femtech apps including Flo,
Dynamic Optimal Timing, and Ovia meet the definition of SACs and should be
regulated by the FDA).
166
See id. at 2283, 2285–86 (“While these apps do have ‘low risk’ features that
serve to educate women about their menstrual cycles or allow them to monitor
their personal health data, they are undeniably marketed and meant to be used as
contraceptives just like Natural Cycles.”).
167
See id. at 2278.
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correctly focus on health risks instead of privacy concerns.168 While
the FDA should undoubtedly subject fertility-predicting femtech
apps to full regulatory control, FDA regulation falls short of the type
of stringent privacy protections needed to protect the data collected
by femtech apps. Additionally, based on current FDA policy, this
approach only applies to apps that meet the definition of SACs,
leaving out all other femtech apps that may nonetheless collect
sensitive user data (e.g., apps that track menstruation and/or sexual
activity but do not give specific contraceptive advice).169 While FDA
regulation is an important step in regulating health risks posed by a
segment of femtech apps,170 the limits of the Agency’s authority
leave many apps unregulated by focusing on risks to public health
rather than risks to privacy.
3. Expanding the Definition of “Covered Entity” Under HIPAA
The best avenue for expanding current privacy protections to
cover data collected by femtech apps is to amend the statutory
definition of “covered entity” under HIPAA. If HIPAA were
amended to include femtech apps as covered entities, user data
would be protected under HIPAA’s Privacy Rule, Security Rule,
and Breach Notification Rule. The Privacy Rule outlines how a
covered entity may use or disclose PHI.171 The Privacy Rule
enumerates a limited number of exceptions in which a covered entity
may be permitted to disclose PHI (e.g., to another healthcare
provider if the disclosure is related to treatment or payment).172
Aside from these narrow permissive uses, however, a covered entity
is prohibited from disclosing an individual’s PHI without obtaining
written authorization.173 Even so, the Privacy Rule mandates that
168

See id. at 2277 (noting that “[t]he FDA’s responsibility to protect public
health underlies its overall approach to testing and regulating medical devices,
including SACs”).
169
See, e.g., Period Tracker by GP Apps, APPLE APP STORE,
https://apps.apple.com/us/app/period-tracker-by-gp-apps/id330376830
[https://perma.cc/55GW-AAFS].
170
See Taylor, supra note 22, at 2283–86.
171
See Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 114, at 4.
172
See id.
173
See id. at 9 (explaining that any authorization to disclose PHI “must be in
plain language and contain specific information regarding the information to be
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covered entities “make reasonable efforts to use, disclose, and
request only the minimum amount of [PHI] needed to accomplish
the intended purpose of the use, disclosure, or request.”174 The
Privacy Rule requires all covered entities to develop written privacy
policies and provide notice to individuals regarding their privacy
practices.175 Additionally, the Privacy Rule outlines a number of
“Administrative Requirements.”176 For example, each covered entity
must designate a “privacy official,” provide privacy training to all
employees, and create procedures that allow individuals to file
privacy complaints.177
HIPAA’s Security Rule applies specifically to electronic PHI
(“e-PHI”) and seeks to “protect the privacy of individuals’ health
information while allowing covered entities to adopt new
technologies to improve the quality and efficiency of patient
care.”178 The Security Rule requires covered entities to ensure that
e-PHI remains confidential and is not disclosed to any unauthorized
third party.179 Additionally, covered entities must implement
safeguards against “reasonably anticipated” security threats and
impermissible uses or disclosures of e-PHI.180 Instead of mandating
specific security measures, the Security Rule requires each covered
entity to consider its own size, characteristics, and resources when
deciding which security safeguards to implement.181 In addition to
this flexible approach, the Security Rule includes a number of
administrative, physical, and technical safeguards with which all
covered entities must comply.182

disclosed or used, the person(s) disclosing and receiving the information,
expiration, right to revoke in writing, and other data”).
174
Id. at 10.
175
See id. at 11, 14.
176
Id. at 14–15.
177
See id. at 14.
178
Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, supra note 114, at 2–3.
179
See id. at 3.
180
See id.
181
See id. at 4 (noting that the Security Rule is “flexible and scalable” in
recognition that “covered entities range from the smallest provider to the largest,
multi-state health plan”).
182
See id. at 4–5.
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Finally, HIPAA’s Breach Notification Rule could provide
further protection for femtech app users if the app experiences a data
breach.183 The Rule requires all covered entities to notify individuals
following any “impermissible use or disclosure . . . that
compromises the security or privacy” of PHI.184 If any impermissible
use or disclosure of PHI occurs, that event is presumed to be a
breach, though this presumption is rebuttable if the covered entity
can prove that PHI was likely not compromised.185 In the case of a
breach, a covered entity must provide notice to all affected
individuals and the HHS Secretary; if the breach affects more than
500 individuals in a given state or jurisdiction, the media must also
be notified.186
While amending HIPAA to include femtech apps as covered
entities would massively expand the protections available for users’
data, this approach poses a few considerable challenges. First, there
is debate over how broadly the definition of “covered entity” should
be interpreted.187 For example, a narrow modification of the
definition would cover only femtech apps that collect data using
biosensors188 (e.g., “body-invasive devices,” like internal
thermometers or smart tampons), while excluding apps that are
merely “general health trackers.”189 This distinction, scholars argue,
would balance the need to promote mobile health innovation with
the need to protect users’ most sensitive information.190 However, as
183

See generally 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.400–414.
See Breach Notification Rule, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/breach-notification/index.html
[https://perma.cc/8JJD-759K].
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See id.
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See id.
187
See Rosas, supra note 3, at 323–24 (proposing a narrow redefinition of
covered entities to include only the most invasive femtech apps as opposed to
other scholars who suggest “a broad sweeping of mHealth applications under
HIPAA’s covered entity definition”).
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See id. at 324 n.36 (describing biosensors as devices that convert
physiological responses into data outputs).
189
See id. at 323–24.
190
See id. at 323–24 (arguing that redefining covered entities to include all
mHealth apps would “unnecessarily burden[] all [f]emtech mobile health
companies, regardless of the technology invented or the amount of personal health
information collected and stored”).
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previously mentioned, many femtech apps collect incredibly
sensitive PHI without using biosensors (e.g., through user input) and
store intimate data related to menstruation, fertility, and
gynecological health. Additionally, HIPAA’s Security Rule lacks
specificity191 and suggests—but does not mandate—using data
encryption to protect PHI.192 The concern about encryption may be
unwarranted, given that the Security Rule requires covered entities
to consider factors (such as technical infrastructure, implementation
costs, and any potential risks to e-PHI) when determining what
security measures are “reasonable and appropriate” to implement.193
Arguably, however, data encryption would be a reasonable and
appropriate measure for femtech apps to implement, considering the
intimate nature of the data collected and the risks involved with any
data breaches.
V. PROPOSED ACTION: AMENDING HIPAA TO COVER FEMTECH
APPS
The unregulated collection of personal, intimate data by femtech
apps across the market puts millions of users’ sensitive reproductive
health data at risk.194 While legal scholars have started to
contemplate what actions lawmakers can take to protect femtech app
users, such proposals have yet to consider solutions that provide
strong data privacy protections while simultaneously exploring
ways that data can contribute to women’s health research. These
goals need not be mutually exclusive, nor do lawmakers need to start
from scratch. Amending HIPAA to cover femtech apps is the most
logical avenue to improve both privacy and research outcomes.
HIPAA’s regulatory framework is already well-suited to ensure
strong privacy and security protections for sensitive data while
providing options for data to be shared with researchers. In fact, one
of the main goals of HIPAA’s Privacy Rule is to “strike a balance”
between protecting PHI and “allowing the flow of health

191

See id. at 337.
See id.
193
See Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, supra note 114, at 4.
194
See Taylor, supra note 22, at 2272.
192
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information needed to . . . protect the public’s health and wellbeing.”195
As described above,196 Title II of HIPPA contains rules that
provide extensive protections for PHI. Certainly, the data collected
by femtech apps meets HIPAA’s definition of PHI.197 Therefore, if
femtech apps are considered covered entities, these HIPAA rules
would ensure femtech apps (1) obtain informed authorization from
users before disclosing any of their data; (2) allow app users to
access their own PHI; (3) mandate security safeguards for the
storage and transmission of user data that must be updated as
technologies and associated risks change; and, (4) require apps to
notify users if their data is used or shared in an impermissible way.
In addition to extensive privacy protections, HIPAA’s Privacy
Rule provides a framework for when and how PHI may be shared
for research purposes.198 Markedly, HIPAA allows covered entities
to use or share PHI for research but only after obtaining an
individual’s written permission,199 and it only permits unauthorized
use or disclosure of PHI in a limited, specified set of circumstances;
otherwise, PHI remains protected.200 Finally, HIPAA allows for the
use or dissemination of any deidentified health information for
research purposes.201 The Privacy Rule provides detailed
instructions on exactly how PHI must be deidentified, including
what information must be removed and how deidentification must
be verified.202 HIPAA’s Privacy Rule best preserves the two
competing interests at play: utilizing femtech apps’ valuable health
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See Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 114, at 1 (2003).
See supra, Part IV.B.3.
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See Rosas, supra note 3, at 323.
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See Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 114.
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See U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., PROTECTING PERSONAL HEALTH
INFORMATION IN RESEARCH: UNDERSTANDING THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 9,
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/privacysummary.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X62Z-XP2Z].
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See id. at 9, 13 (noting that the waiver or alteration of authorization must be
approved by an Institutional Review Board or Privacy Board).
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See id. at 9.
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See id. at 9–10.
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data to advance women’s health research and protecting users’
sensitive information through privacy regulations.
Congress should amend HIPAA’s definition of “covered entity”
to include, at a minimum, any app that collects and stores data about
users’ reproductive health. Undoubtedly, amending HIPAA to
include femtech apps under the definition of “covered entity”
depends on congressional will. While surely a significant hurdle,
HIPAA has been amended and modernized before, including for the
purposes of expanding what constitutes a covered entity and adding
provisions that reflect the recent shift to electronic healthcare.203
Through such amendments, Congress and HHS have recognized
HIPAA’s flexibility and ensured that PHI is protected in the
increasingly digital healthcare world.204 With the recent explosion of
femtech apps on the market, Congress should consider further
amending HIPAA to meet the challenges of today. Congressional
representatives have introduced numerous legislative proposals in
recent years to address data privacy issues, including provisions for
health data.205 While there is an urgent need for broad,
comprehensive data privacy legislation in the United States,
Congress does not need to start from scratch when it comes to
protecting data collected and stored on femtech apps. HIPAA
provides an ideal regulatory framework and already protects the
same types of PHI that is collected by femtech apps. Additionally,
many proposed privacy laws are intended to apply broadly and
203

See Jacqueline Bui, Lack of Privacy Regulations in the Fitness and Health
Mobile App Industry: Assessing HIPAA for Meeting the Needs of User Data
Collection, 21 UNIV. S.F. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 1, 4–5 (2016). In 2009,
Congress enacted the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical
Health Act (“HITECH Act”) in response to the industry-wide shift toward
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the scope of business associates of covered entities to include downstream entities
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entity.” See id. at 5.
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See Barbara Fox, Mobile Medical Apps: Where Health and Internet Privacy
Law Meet, 14 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 193, 214–15 (2014).
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See Keats Citron, supra note 4, at 1838 (identifying that “[d]ozens upon
dozens of privacy bills are under consideration at the federal and state levels”).
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would likely not contain specific provisions that consider ways PHI
can be used to advance women’s health research. HIPAA, on the
other hand, already contains regulations that address the
concomitant privacy and research concerns around PHI and should
be amended to cover the data that femtech apps collect.
VI. CONCLUSION
Every day, femtech apps collect personal, intimate data about
the reproductive health of millions of users, and that number is
projected to increase over the next five years. However, there are
scant protections for the data these apps collect—leaving users at
the whim of corporate discretion. There is an urgent need for greater
privacy regulation of femtech apps to protect the sensitive and
deeply personal information collected from their users. While
privacy concerns are vitally important, new privacy protections
must be flexible enough to allow the medical research community
to utilize the valuable data collected by femtech apps to fill
persistent gaps in the understanding of key women’s health issues.
A privacy-protective yet malleable approach would safeguard
PHI while promoting advances in public health research. As U.S.
privacy law stands, the most logical and straight-forward way to
accomplish these dual goals is to amend HIPAA’s definition of
“covered entity” to include femtech apps. If femtech apps were to
constitute covered entities, Title II of HIPAA would provide an
existing regulatory framework with strong privacy and security
protections for the highly sensitive data collected by femtech apps.
At the same time, Title II provides a pathway for the data collected
by femtech apps to support critical research efforts while
maintaining privacy and respecting app users’ personal preferences.
Amending HIPAA is not an ovary-action—by simply embracing
femtech apps as covered entities under HIPAA, Congress can use
the existing law to protect the millions of femtech app users whose
data is currently at risk of being compromised.

